This study examines how Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554), the Eighth Karma pa of the Karma Bka' brgyud lineage, articulates and defends a key distinction between consciousness (rnam shes) and wisdom (ye shes). The first paper focuses on the author's clarification of the distinction both as an accurate account of the nature and structure of human consciousness and as an indispensable principle of Buddhist soteriology. Arguing that human beings have two "concurrent but nonconvergent" modes of awareness, conditioned and unconditioned, Mi bskyod rdo rje urges the practitioner to discern amidst the adventitious flux of dichotomic thoughts an innate nondual mode of awareness that is regarded as the ground and goal of the Buddhist path. That the recognition of their difference is the key to realizing their underlying unity is central to the Karma pa's response to the perennial Buddhist problem of reconciling two divergent Buddhist models of reality: [1] a differentiation model based on robust distinctions between conventional and ultimate truths or realities (saṃvṛtisatya versus paramārthasatya) and their associated modes of cognition and [2] an identification (yuganaddha) model of the two realities (satyadvaya : bden gnyis) which emphasizes their underlying unity. This article concludes with an annotated translation and critical edition of a short text by the Karma pa on the subject entitled "Two minds in one person? A Reply to the Queries of Bla ma Khams pa" (bla ma khams pa'i dris lan mi gcig sems gnyis).
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The relationship between consciousness (Skt. Vijñāna, Tib. rnam shes) and wisdom (jñāna : ye shes) has been the focus of much discussion and debate in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism. Perhaps few scholars in the history of Buddhist thought have given more detailed and nuanced attention to clarifying the nature of this relationship and its soteriological ramifications than Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507-1554), the Eighth Karma pa of the Karma kaṃ tshang lineage. In his many and varied treatments of this issue, Mi bskyod rdo rje comes up against the perennial problem of how to understand and reconcile two traditional Buddhist models of reality and cognition.
One is a differentiation model based on robust distinctions between conventional and ultimate truths or realities (saṃvṛtisatya versus paramārthasatya) and their associated modes of cognition. The other is an identification or unity (yuganaddha) model of the two realities (satyadvaya : bden gnyis) and their associated modes of cognition. In Buddhist scholasticism, the differentiation model was typically aligned with a strongly innatist view of the ultimate (buddha nature, the nature of mind, or the nature of reality) which underscores its "sublime otherness" (gzhan mchog) from all that is conventional and adventitious. This model has figured in a wide range of canonical Buddhist distinctions between innate and adventitious modes of reality and their associated prediscursive and discursive modes of cognition.
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By contrast, the identification or unity model, predicated on the acceptance of a prediscursive dimension of human experience which is the source of all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, has drawn attention to the pervasiveness of the ultimate and its immanence within the conventional in order to indicate how the ultimate permeates the mind-streams of individuals in bondage. The unity model has found expression in a variety of Madhyamaka and tantric formulations, such as the nonduality (advaya : gnyis med) or coemergence (sahaja : lhan cig skyes pa) of the two truths or realities, the unity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa ('khor 'das zung 'jug) , the inseparability of manifestation and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med), and the unity of thoughts and dharmakāya.
Tibetan scholars have devoted considerable attention to the issue of how to reconcile and coordinate these differentiation and unity models within pertinent traditional Buddhist theoretical contexts such as buddha nature (tathāgatagarbha), the two truths (satyadvaya), the three natures (trisvabhāva), the two modes of emptiness (rang stong and gzhan stong), the hermeneutics of the three turnings of the dharmacakra, and the related hermeneutical distinction between definitive meaning (nītārtha) and provisional meaning (neyārtha). The aim of this paper is to explain how Mi bskyod rdo rje could be both an advocate of robust soteriological distinctions between innate and adventitious modes of reality and cognition (differentiation model) and at the same time a proponent of the Mahāmudrā view of the unity (zung 'jug) nonduality (gnyis med) or inseparability (dbyer med) of the ultimate and conventional. It is argued that his attempts to resolve this antinomy were guided by his philosophical Madhyamaka ambition to chart a middle course between the two metaphysical extremes of absolutism (known as the extreme of eternalism or existence) and nihilism (the extreme of annihilation or nonexistence). With this trajectory in sight, the Karma pa shows how the meditator on the path must distinguish adventitious from innate modes of cognition in order to discern the mind's preconceptual nature from the flux of superfluous mental and affective activities that reify and obscure it. But to the extent that the meditator realises a "unity beyond extremes" wherein superfluous thoughts and feelings are recognised as distortive (conventional) manifestations of the abiding (ultimate) nature of mind and reality, the former are resolved into the latter and both are understood to be alike in remaining beyond discursive elaboration (spros bral).
The doctrinal background of the two models
Let us begin by sketching in rough strokes some Indian antecedents of the two models and the problem of reconciliation they brought into play. One highly influential precedent for the differentiation model was Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha I. [45] [46] [47] [48] 3 where the author drew a sharp distinction between unconditioned supramundane mind (lokottaracitta) and the conditioned substratum consciousness (ālayavijñāna), thereby specifying an innate, unconditioned mode of cognition that is prior to and a precondition of the eight modes of consciousness (kun gzhi tshogs brgyad) as elaborated in the Yogācāra psychology. By contrast, influential examples of the identification model that are encountered in the Laṅkāvatāra and *Ghanavyūha sūtras explicitly identify buddha nature with the substratum consciousness (ālayavijñāna). may also mention here a parallel unity or nondifferentiation model of truth/reality, which was widely adopted in many non-tantric and tantric discourses emphasising the nonduality of the two realities (bden gnyis gnyis med), the inseparability of appearance and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med), and unity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and coemergence of mind and wisdom.
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Faced with the task of reconciling these seemingly incommensurable ontological and soteriological paradigms, leading post-classical Bka' brgyud thinkers such as Mi bskyod rdo rje adopted different versions of soteriological contextualism, a term I have elsewhere coined to describe the view that the sense, relevance and efficacy of soteriological models can only be understood relative to the context(s) in which they are employed.
6 From this perspective, the differentiation and unity models, with their seemingly oppositional categories and metaphorics -the first positing a basic difference between conventional and ultimate and comparing it to the sky and its clouds, the second positing their essential equality as illustrated by the ocean and its waves -came to be regarded not as contradictory but as complementary, relating as they do to different contexts of salvific theory and praxis. According to Mi bskyod rdo rje, an aspirant on the Buddhist path should conceptually distinguish what is to be abandoned ("adventitious mind", glo bur gyi sems) from what is to be realised ("innate mind", gnyug ma'i sems). But this path is said to lead beyond such oppositional constructs, culminating in the disclosure of a nondual nonconceptual wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna) of the undifferentiated nature of things (dharmadhātu) which recognises all spiritual countermeasures (gnyen po) as being of the same unborn (skye med) and prediscursive (spros bral) nature as what they are meant to counteract.
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This is the view of unity (zung 'jug), which is generally identified as a hallmark of Mahāmudrā teachings. In this view, the Buddhist path is ultimately self-undermining insofar as the conceptual distinctions which are necessary to realise nondual nonconceptual wisdom necessarily consume themselves at the time of its realisation. 8 vijñāpti or subtle inward mind, which 'Gos lo identifies with the dharmadhātu. Based on the identification of the ālayavijñāna with the tathāgatagarbha, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra interprets āśrayaparāvṛtti as the transformation or purification of the seventh consciousness (manas), which liberates the pure ālayavijñāna. Cf. W. Lai, The Meaning of "Mind-Only" (Wei-Hsin) : An Analysis of a Sinitic Mahāyāna Phenomenon, "Philosophy East and West" 1977, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 67 f. In a similar vein, the *Ghanavyūhasūtra states (D 110, 55b 1 ; L 113, 85a 6-7 ): "The Tathāgata taught *sugatagarbha using the term ālaya [vijñāna] ." bde gshegs snying po dge ba'ang de | | snying po de la kun gzhi sgras | de bzhin gshegs pa ston pa mdzad |
5
These models and their doctrinal sources are examined in D. Higgins, M. Draszczyk, op.cit. 6 For a general account of contextualist views, which have been gaining popularity in contemporary philosophy, cf. A.W. Price, Contextuality in practical reason, Oxford 2008. 7 Shākya mchog ldan had similarly maintained that while realisation of the unity of the two truths, and of appearance and emptiness, was the goal of the Buddhist path, it is nonetheless necessary to balance the divergent perspectives of consciousness and wisdom while on the path. Likewise, the second 'Brug chen Padma dkar po (a contemporary of Mi bskyod rdo rje) used Yang dgon pa's distinction between mahāmudrā in its modes of abiding (gnas lugs phyag chen) and delusion ('khrul lugs phyag chen) to underscore the need to discern the irreducible unity of the common ground (mahāmudrā in the abiding mode) from the reifications which distort and conceal it (the mode of delusion). On their interpretations, cf. D. Higgins, M. Draszczyk, op.cit. 
Karma Bka' brgyud assimilations of the differentiation model
The Eighth Karma pa's views regarding wisdom (ye shes) and the nature of mind (sems nyid, sems kyi rang bzhin) and how they differ from consciousness (rnam shes) and dualistic mind (sems) are indebted to the works of his Karma kaṃ tshang predecessors, particularly the Third Karma pa Rang byung rdo rje. In general, Bka' brgyud exegetes deployed a varied repertoire of distinctions between mind and the nature of mind drawn from a diverse body of texts and commentaries belonging to the Mahāyāna, Vajrayāna and Siddha genres. Tibetan terms variously used to describe the nature of mind -some of which were translations of Indic terms, others Some of these are included in a list of synonyms (ming gi rnam grangs) for the beginningless nature of mind (sems nyid thog med) given by Karma phrin las pa in his Zab mo nang don nyin byed 'od kyi phreng ba, 17 6 -18 2 : "As for its quasi-synonyms, which are said to be limitless, they include natural awareness, fresh mind, innate mind, Mahāmudrā, supreme bliss, nāda, invincible hūṃ, space-pervading space vajra, tathāgatagarbha, energy current of wisdom, central channel of wisdom, invincible seminal nucleus and Prajñāpāramitā 10 On this important Bka' brgyud Mahāmudrā term, cf. D. Higgins, M. Draszczyk, op.cit., pp. 36, 59, 153, 163, 176, 178, 187 and n. 534, 283, 338 et passim. ma'i sems nyid), innate mind (gnyug ma'i yid), wisdom (ye shes), nondual wisdom (gnyis med kyi ye shes), naked awareness (rjen pa'i shes pa), and coemergent wisdom (lhan cig skyes pa'i ye shes). Bka' brgyud exegetes used such terms not only to characterise the enduring, nondual character of mind but also to emphasise its primacy, and its distinction from adventitious dualistic mind (sems), mentality (yid), cognition (shes pa) or consciousness (rnam shes). These latter terms commonly describe delusive objectifying and subjectivising forms of cognition that Buddhist insight and practices aim to transcend. Mi bskyod rdo rje often registers his concern about the lack of conceptual precision among Buddhist exegetes regarding the proper formulation and use of such distinctions, taking the term sems nyid as a case in point. The particle nyid, he argues, denotes a basic nature (chos nyid) of the phenomenon (chos can)
11 mind, and is used "in the sense of an ineliminable distinctive feature" (khyad chos mi spong bar don) which should never be confused with the conventional condition or characteristics of ordinary mind. Mi bskyod rdo rje accorded considerable importance to the distinction between pure mind and impure mind introduced by Karma pa III Rang byung rdo rje on the basis of Mahāmudrā and the Maitreya texts. The Third Karma pa had maintained
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The Eighth Karma pa here understands the term chos can, phenomena, to refer to that which possesses the nature of phenomena.
12 The term gnas lugs renders various Sanskrit terms including [1] vṛtta (appearance, occurred, become, turned, matter, incident, issue, mode of life, state, as e.g., vastuvṛtta : dngos po'i gnas lugs, nature of things); [2] sthiti (abiding, staying, situation, state, abode, remaining or being in any state or condition); [3] saṃniveśa (assembly, situation, open place, foundation); and [4] saṃsthāna (being, standing, abiding, standing still or firm, abode, dwelling-place, nature, essence, there-being (Dasein), condition). In the present context, it refers to the prevailing mode or state of mind, as indicated by the alternative defining characteristic (mnyam nyid). Cf. Negi 1993 Negi -2005 16 by analogy with space which supports the other elements but is itself unsupported by any, and [3] mind's luminous nature ('od gsal ba'i sems) as described in Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā 5b.1-2. 17 His commentators further identify the pure mind with the tantric hermeneutical categories of the ground of the clearing process (sbyang gzhi), the first of the four aspects of the clearing process and the continuum (rgyud : tantra) of the ground or causal phase, and the first of the three continuities (rgyud gsum) whose locus classicus is said to be the supplemental tantra (uttaratantra) of the Guhyasamāja.
18 Such identifications reveal the extent to which Rang byung rdo rje and his successors looked for doctrinal common ground among discourses on the nature of mind found in the sūtras, tantras and Siddha works in order to highlight regions of shared soteriological concern and semantic reference.
Rang byung rdo rje equates the impure mind with the ālayavijñāna, which is taken, following texts such as the Abhidharmasamuccaya and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha, to refer to the source of all obscurations, but not of buddhajñāna which, conversely, is identified as what destroys the ālayavijñāna. 19 Rang byung rdo rje's Rnying ma colleague Klong chen rab 'byams pa drew a similar distinction between pure mind (sems dag pa) and impure mind (sems ma dag pa) and further subdivided pure mind into pure mind as such (sems nyid dag pa) and pure mind (sems dag pa) in order to underscore how the "pure" applications of ordinary mind -ethical and contemplative 18 According to colophonic information appended to this text in different editions of the Rnying ma rgyud 'bum, the Guhyasamāja mūlatantra (GST) was translated by Vimalamitra and Ska ba dpal brtsegs circa the 8th century, whereas the appended uttaratantra (Ch. 18), known in Tibetan as Gsang 'dus rgyud phyi ma ("Later Guhyasamāja"), was translated later by Buddhaguhya and 'Brog mi dpal ye shes. Cf. R. -that are conducive to goal-realisation differ from the primordially pure nature of mind, which is the state of realisation itself. Rang byung rdo rje also advocated a key distinction between supramundane mind ('jigs rten las 'das pa'i sems : lokottaracitta) and mundane mind -the ālayavijñāna with its eightfold consciousness (kun gzhi tshogs brgyad) -in his Zab mo nang don with reference to *Mahāyānasaṃgraha 1.45-48 20 as well as in his Dharmadhātustava commentary to stanza 46ab, which states that mind is observed to have two aspects, the mundane and transmundane.
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The idea that there is a mode of consciousness more fundamental than ālayavijñāna was implicit in the distinction between ālayavijñāna and supramundane mind that was famously elaborated in the above-mentioned *Mahāyānasaṃgraha passage .
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Sthiramati drew a similar distinction between ālayavijñāna and the supramundane jñāna (lokottarajñāna : jigs rten las 'das pa'i ye shes) which overturns or replaces it (parāvṛtti) in his commentary on Triṃśikā 29-30.
23 Building on the Third Karma pa Rang byung rdo rje's distinction between pure and impure minds, the Karma pa's commentator Dwags ram pa Chos rgyal bstan pa (1449-1524) had reaffirmed that the so-called pure mind (dag pa'i sems) which is identified as the causal continuum (rgyu rgyud) of tantrism and pure all-ground wisdom (dag pa kun gzhi ye shes) is to be differentiated from the ālayavijñāna, which constitutes impure mind (sems ma dag pa'i kun gzhi rnam shes).
24 Citing MS 1.45-48 in support of this view, he further notes that "this MS text specifically characterises the ālayavijñāna as the basis of sentient being (sems can gyi gnas) but says it is not the cause of nirvāṇa (mya ngan las 'das pa'i rgyu)."
25 But if this is the case, what does produce the qualities of purification (rnam par byang ba'i chos : vyavadānadharma)? To this rejoinder, Dwags ram pa answers that "the entire range of qualities of purification depend on the all-ground wisdom (kun gzhi ye shes), the aforementioned pure mind."
26 He goes on to criticise certain Sa skya Lam 'bras followers who, having neither seen nor heard the MS passages cited above, assert that the ālayavijñāna is the causal continuum all-ground (kun gzhi rgyu rgyud), thereby exhibiting their own hidden flaws (of interpretation). 28 This short text (edited and translated in the Appendix below) offers a lucid summary of the Eighth Karma pa's views in support of "a certain [unspecified] person's assertion that two minds exist separately and non-convergently within every sentient being." 29 We can detect in the Karma pa's affirmative answer -he deems this assertion to be fully "in accord with the enlightened intent of all the buddhas of the three times" -his characteristic blending of the key distinctions concerning buddha nature and the nature of mind that are integral elements of his interpretative standpoint.
To abridge the main points, Mi bskyod rdo rje begins by noting that Rang byung rdo rje explained in his Zab mo nang don auto-commentary that mind has both pure and impure modes, and that this is described in the Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV I.47) according to the three phases of impure, pure-impure and completely pure. As the Eighth Karma pa explains, the pure mode refers to self-aware wisdom free from obscurations (sgrib bral rang rig pa'i ye shes), whereas the "impure" refers to mundane consciousness that is deluded ignorance along with its obscurations (sgrib bcas rmongs pa ma rig pa'i rnam par shes pa). To sharpen the contrast between pure (innate) and impure (adventitious) modes of consciousness, he redeploys a distinction that was widely used by realist Buddhist philosophical schools: "when these are [taken] metaphorically as different 'entities', the former is the substantially existing entity (rdzas yod kyi dngos po : dravyasat vastu) 30 whereas the latter is a nominally existing entity (btags yod kyi dngos po : prajñaptisat vastu). This is because the former is buddha nature -innate, self-originated, and innately undeluded, whereas the 28 Rheingans 2008 contains a short discussion of this text (220-221). The identity of the Bla ma khams pa is unknown, the colophon mentioning only that the text was composed in reply to a question by Bla ru bla ma, uncle and nephew (bla ru bla ma khu dbon) (J. Rheingans In line with this linguistic convention, he goes on to say that when the sun of nondeluded wisdom which is substantially existent dawns, the dark shroud of the deluded nominally existent consciousness is dispelled. The Karma pa concludes that those who want to awaken to unsurpassed, complete and perfect buddhahood must accept innate mind and reject adventitious mind without mixing or confusing the two. "This is so," he maintains, "because the goal of complete purification is not attained by any path apart from that and because when one takes as a cause what is not a cause, 32 despite one's exertions, there is only exhaustion that is fruitless [i.e. has no result]." Now, in regard to the authentic or innate mind (gnyug ma'i sems) which equated with buddha nature in the mind-streams of sentient beings, the author describes it as a "boundless complex that is indivisible into the categories of 'consciousness' and 'wisdom'."
34 On the other hand, he continues, "the mind of adventitious stains may have been arbitrarily described using the terms 'wisdom' or 'consciousness': extensively, as the eightfold ensemble (Yogācāra); more concisely as the sixfold ensemble (non-Yogācāra) and, most succinctly, as nothing more than a single complex because it is a limited cognition that sees a limited object of knowledge." 
The problem of reconciling differentiation and unity
At this point, a question unavoidably arises: "if the innate and adventitious minds exist separately but nonconvergently in the continuum of a single individual, does this not contradict [Sgam po pa's] precept that 'thoughts themselves are dharmakāya'?"
36
In other words, if ordinary thoughts are fundamentally distinct from dharmakāya -as would appear to follow from the sharp distinctions drawn between innate and adventitious mind streams, and between buddha nature and adventitious stains -this would seem at first glance to preclude Sgam po pa's assertion that thoughts are in essence not different from dharmakāya. point to a fundamental incompatibility, or even incommensurability, between the differentiation and unity models of goal-realisation? Mi bskyod rdo rje's response to this quandary, cryptic though it is, gives important clues on the specific type of unity (yuganaddha) model he endorses and how it can resolve the apparent inconsistencies: "There is no contradiction," he replies, "because the thoughts of adventitious mind do not exist as fundamentally different from the dharmakāya of innate mind, but that mind which exists only as conceptual superimposition, therefore has no independent existence, even conventionally, apart from dharmakāya. Hence 'thoughts themselves are indeed dharmakāya'."
37 38 Put simply, thoughts are dharmakāya in the specific sense that they are phenomenal (chos can) expressions of the nature of phenomena (chos nyid): they are discursive superimpositions which both derive and deviate from their prediscursive source.
Returning to the dialogue, Bla ma Khams pa next asks what is meant by "innate mind," to which the Karma pa answers that it is natural awareness (tha mal gyi shes pa) in one's own mind-stream in the present moment. In response to the ensuing question of whether the "two minds" thesis makes claims (in tantric and Siddha discourses) about the inseparability (dbyer med) or equality (mnyam nyid) of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa problematic, he replies "this is not a problem, because phenomena of the saṃsāric and nirvāṇic minds are both conventionally alike in being separate and nonconvergent", and yet they are inseparable inasmuch as "the very nature of the saṃsāric and nirvāṇic minds is ultimately present as a great openness and equality, inseparable in their freedom from discursive elaborations." To summarise, Mi bskyod rdo rje advocates a model of unity (yuganaddha) characterised by an asymmetrical priority relation between the terms of the relation: adventitious mind is inseparable from innate mind insofar as it exists only nominally, that is, as a superfluous superimposition or epiphenomenon that resolves into the innate mind -i.e. its very nature, dharmakāya -at the time of goal-realisation. Until such time, these two modes are present concurrently but nonconvergently in the mind-streams of sentient beings. 
Clarifying the relationship between consciousness and wisdom
The Eighth Karma pa elsewhere consecrates considerable attention to another key distinction, between consciousness (rnam shes) and wisdom (ye shes), which played a central role in the Third Karma pa's tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna exegesis. The sixth chapter of Rang byung rdo rje's Zab mo nang gi don, a detailed exposition on body, mind and cosmos according to the Highest Yoga tantras (bla na med pa'i rnal 'byor gyi rgyud), is devoted to clarifying the complex relationship between rnam shes and ye shes and the transition between them. 39 The distinction is further clarified in his Treatise on Distinguishing Consciousness and Wisdom (rnam shes ye shes 'byed pa'i bstan bcos), 40 which details the fundamental transformation of the eightfold consciousness into the four modes of wisdom as elaborated in Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IX.67 f. (and IX.42 f.), 41 which was expanded to five in the Kālacakra and other Higher Yoga tantras.
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The distinction between vijñāna (rnam shes) and jñāna (ye shes) has a long history in Indian Buddhism, 43 an early and influential example being its occurrence as the fourth of four "recourses" (pratisaraṇa : rton pa) of textual hermeneutics -namely, the injunction "to rely on wisdom, not on consciousness" -which were outlined in the Catuḥpratisaraṇasūtra and widely quoted from the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā onward. 44 In this regard, the Bodhisattvabhūmi comments that the four truths are not understood merely through discursive knowledge (vijñāna) gained by study and 41 The classification of four states of mind -waking, dreaming, deep sleep and the fourth state -can be traced to the Upaniṣads, and is a major theme of the Mandukya Upaniṣad. It has been suggested that the Kālacakra association of the first three states with the three guṇas/doṣas of Brahmanical Sāṃkhya and Ayurvedic systems -sattva, rajas and tamas respectively -represents one of its many striking similarities with Indian non-Buddhist systems, especially nondual Kaśmīr Śaivaite tantrism. A crucial difference, however, is that the Śaivaite tantras portray the fourth state of self-realisation in which one realises the essential Self (ātman) and thereby transcends ignorance, whereas the Kālacakra specifies that the fourth state, although nondual at the time of sexual emission, is still tainted by latent tendencies of ignorance, and must therefore be eliminated in order to attain wisdom (jñāna) and supreme bliss (mahāsukha). Cf. V.A. Wallace, The Inner Kālacakratantra a Buddhist Tantric View of the Individual, New York 2001, pp. 36-38, 156-157 et passim. 42 Cf. K. Mathes, op.cit., p. 262 f. 43 The reviewer of this paper pointed out that this distinction also has a long history in the Brāmaṇical tradition and can be traced at least as far back as the epic literature. There, "when vijñāna and jñāna are opposed, the first is usually the ordinary knowledge, whereas the second is the supramunane knowledge of the true nature of things (ātman, God etc.)" (from reviewer's comments).
44 The classic study of these four principles, literally "recourses" (pratisaraṇa : rton pa), is É. Lamotte, The Assessment of Textual Interpretation in Buddhism, "Buddhist Studies Review" 1985, vol. 2 , no. 1. There he renders vijñāna as "discursive consciousness" and jñāna as "direct knowledge". The fourth recourse was said to encompass the first three: [1] rely on the teachings, not the person; [2] rely on the meanings, not the words; [3] rely on definitive meanings, not provisional meanings.
reflection, but through direct knowledge (jñāna) based on meditation.
45 Mention should also be made of Candrakīrti's distinction in the Prasannapadā (on MMK XXV.16) between jñāna (ye shes) and vijñāna (rnam shes) which La Valleé Poussin, in his critical edition of MMK, glosses as "intuitif" and "discursif" respectively.
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However, as with the parallel distinctions between sems/sems nyid, sems/ye shes and sems/rig pa that are also extensively developed in Rnying ma exegesis, the search for Indian antecedents typically turns up only scattered references, and seldom the kind of rigorous philosophical treatment that such distinctions received in the hands of their Tibetan interpreters, especially those in the Bka' brgyud and Rnying ma schools.
In a number of exegetical contexts, Mi bskyod rdo rje protests that the distinction between ordinary consciousness (rnam shes : vijñāna) and wisdom (ye shes : jñāna) was not always adequately drawn in Indian texts, and deems this to be a source of significant confusion. A case in point is his objection in his Madhyamakāvatāra (MA) commentary to the tendency he observes in classical Yogācāra-Cittamātra texts (unfortunately these are not specified) to confuse the definitions of consciousness (rnam shes) and wisdom (ye shes), thereby blurring the difference between them. He hints that this tradition's lack of terminological specificity and vagueness regarding the criteria which are sufficient or necessary for the application of terms referring to dualistic and nondualistic modes of cognition may be attributed to its proclivity to treat mind as a real entity. Of the Alīkākāravāda Cittamātra thinkers, he says "since you did not grasp the essential and specific properties 47 of what is meant by "apprehended-apprehending" and thus took [it] as the meaning of "consciousness" (rnam shes) or "awareness" (rig pa), you imputed that which is only [ordinary] knowledge (shes pa) to "wisdom" (ye shes) and proceeded to aggrandise it to [the status of] a truly established ultimate." 48 The author proceeds to offer a genealogical analysis of the roots of this lack of terminological specificity in Indian Cittamātra works, and relates this to the problems faced by Tibetan translators of Buddhist terms for cognition:
Thus, there are limitless terms in Cittamātra texts for [nondual knowledge], some calling it nondual knowing (gnyis med kyi shes pa), some calling it nondual wisdom (gnyis med kyi ye shes), some calling it mere knowledge without duality (gnyis su med pa'i shes pa tsam) and some [others] calling it nondual mind and awareness (gnyis med kyi blo dang rig pa). Should one think "what is the point of such occurrences?", the verbal root jñā was rendered as knowledge (shes pa) or restricted to transcendent knowledge (mkhyen pa), 49 [said] anything at all about the need to lexically delimit cases where "mind" or "cognition" in Cittamātra accounts referred to [ordinary] consciousness (rnam shes) and where "mind" or "cognition" in Madhyamaka accounts referred to "wis-dom" (ye shes). Therefore, since "consciousness" could have the sense of the term "wisdom", while "wisdom" could have the sense of the term "consciousness", it was not [observed] that the applications of these two definitions are completely in-compatible [with one another].
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Mi bskyod rdo rje here identifies semantic vagueness, specifically criterial vagueness, as a source of certain basic category errors pertaining to the nature and structure of human cognition.
51 His student and secretary Gtsug lag phreng ba (1504-1566) adds to this assessment his own observation that early Tibetan translators (during the Royal Dynastic Period, ca. 7th-9th c. CE) found it necessary to variously render jñāna as shes pa ("cognition") or rnam shes ("consciousness") when describing the cognition of a sentient being, and as ye shes ("primordial knowing") when describing the cognition of a buddha, there being no such difference conspicuous in the original term:
In general, there were imperial edicts requiring scholar-translators to translate the term jñāna as rnam shes or shes pa when referring to the cognition of a sentient being or as ye shes when referring to the cognition of a buddha, despite there being no [such] As Philip Devos argues, semantic vagueness is an inherent semantic language phenomenon. That is, it is a language phenomenon, and not an extra-linguistic one, given that vagueness cannot be imputed to objects or the world. And it is a semantic phenomenon, not a pragmatic one (i.e. the intentional use of semantic vagueness, for example the use of "collateral damage" as a euphemism for state-sanctioned manslaughter). Cf. Devos 2003, 123-124 . Words are vague when their semantic scope is unclear. This happens in at least these two ways: [1] vagueness in criteria -the inherent indeterminacy or uncertainty regarding the criteria used in the application of a word. E.g. what activities are included in "sport".
[2] vagueness in degree -the degree or extent that determines when we can or cannot apply words. E.g. when does one become "old"?; how close does someone have to live to be a "neighbour"? Ibid., 124-125. The Eighth Karma pa indeed appears to be claiming that Buddhist terms for cognition, especially as deployed in certain Cittamātra texts, are characterised by criterial vagueness, which is a function not only of their polysemy (multiple possible meanings of a single term) but also their semantic indeterminacy, "a phenomenon in which one single word meaning refers to a segment of reality which is further cognitively divisible and specifiable into smaller and clearer segments" (Devos, ibid., 130) .
In other words, the early Tibetan translators recognised that the polysemy of Indian Buddhist terms for cognition presented early Tibetan translators with a significant problem for translation and understanding so long as the semantic ranges of specific uses of terms were not carefully drawn and the criteria sufficient and necessary for using such terms consistently applied. One way, therefore, that early translators sought to ameliorate this type of semantic indeterminacy was by introducing a number of Tibetan renderings of a single Sanskrit term (jñāna, vidyā etc.) and employing these variants in translating the terms according to the specific contexts in which they had been used.
For Mi bskyod rdo rje, the distinction between wisdom and consciousness is not only a cornerstone of Buddhist thought and practice in general, but also an indispensable key point in his own Bka' brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition's instructions on recognising the nature of mind. The Eighth Karma pa therefore reserved some of his harshest criticisms for those among his coreligionists who had, in his eyes, failed to adequately distinguish the innate and adventitious modalities of consciousness. In the second and final part of this study, I will turn my attention to some of Mi bskyod rdo rje's polemical criticisms of Tibetan scholars, whom he accused of conflating aspects of consciousness with aspects of wisdom.
According to the phases of being impure, Partly pure and partly impure, and completely pure, One speaks of a sentient being, a bodhisattva And a Tathāgata [Thus-gone] .
To explain the second, [the Zab mo nang don 1.1] states:
As for the cause, it is the beginningless nature of mind, Although uncurtailed in scope and not falling into bias, From [the perspective of] its unimpeded play, It is empty in essence, luminous in nature and Unimpeded in aspects, manifesting as anything.
[Thus,] it does not recognise itself by itself.
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In terms of this explanation, the first mind is self-aware wisdom free from obscurations. The second is consciousness that is delusional ignorance possessing obscurations.
[Now,] from these being conventionally [taken as] different "entities", the former is the substantially existing entity (rdzas yod kyi dngos po : dravyasat vastu), 56 whereas the latter is a nominally existing entity (btags yod kyi dngos po : prajñaptisat vastu). This is because the former is buddha nature -innate, self-originated, and innately undeluded, whereas the latter is the chaff [i.e. superfluous] part -adventitious defilement, innately deluded, and saṃsāric. Now, in terms of linguistic convention, when the sun of undeluded substantially existing wisdom dawns, the dark shroud of deluded nominally existing consciousness is dispelled. When those who want to awaken to unsurpassed, complete and perfect buddhahood engage in accepting and rejecting these two "minds" [respectively] without mixing them up, by this training, they are fully awakened. This is so because the result of complete purification is not attained by any path apart from that and because when one takes as a cause what is not a cause, 57 despite one's exertions, there is only exhaustion that is fruitless [i.e. has no result]. Now, the mind that is buddha nature in the mind-streams of sentient beings is a limitless and immeasurable whole that is indivisible into categories of "consciousness" and "wisdom". However, the adventitious mind may have been arbitrarily described using the terms "wisdom" or "consciousness": if [described] In Abhidharma, the substantially existing entity is any ultimate simple, anything that cannot be reduced either physically or conceptually into smaller units, whereas the nominally existing entity is anything physically or conceptually constructed that is therefore superfluous and reducible to smaller units. The former are dharmas and possess intrinsic nature (svabhāva). The latter are not dharmas, being without intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva). Cf. AK 6.4. According to this view, only momentary entities are substantially real, whereas the temporal series formed by them (santāna) has only nominal existence. Cf. A. Rospatt, op.cit., p. 97. 57 That is, "if one takes the adventitious mind as the cause or basis of awakening...".
